Abstract
Introduction
There are many markets where individuals on one side of the market use the services of intermediaries to get in contact with members on the other side of the market. Examples of such markets include the online dating market and the housing market. The online dating market is particularly interesting as the number of users of online dating services has been increasing year after year. A survey conducted by Pew Research Center and Statista.com found that annual revenue of the US online dating industry has grown from $43 million in 2009 to nearly $295 million in 2014, and is projected to increase further to $400 million by 2017.
1 There are nearly 4000 firms in the online dating market. While firms like Match.com and eHarmony cater to the general audience and have a significant market share, there have also been a proliferation of niche dating sites. The online dating market in the UK is worth about 300 million pounds as of 2014 and there are nearly 1400 dating sites in UK alone. 2 Increasing popularity of matrimonial websites, which assist in brokering marriages, in countries like India testifies that such matching market is growing in developing countries as well (Agrawal, 2015; Titzamann, 2013; Shako, 2004) . 3 Interestingly, unlike most online businesses, an average matrimonial website collects about 95 percent of its revenues by charging user fees, while remaining five percent of its revenues come from advertisements. 4 These online matching intermediaries basically lower the search cost for users of these services and create marketplaces where an individual can meet other people. Furthermore, the presence of multiple intermediary firms in this market implies that incumbent firms are able to accommodate the entry of new firms. It is this issue of entry accommodation that is of interest to us in this paper.
We consider competition in a model of intermediation, where an incumbent matchmaker faces the threat of entry from a potential entrant. The models of intermediation gained prominence after the seminal work of Gale and Shapley (1968) , and Roth and Sotomayor (1990) . Julien (2001a, 2003 ) study a model of competition between cybermediaries, where competition is characterized by asymmetric network externalities. In our model we do not focus on the issue of network externalities, instead we model the issue of entry. More recent work on intermediation include Armstrong (2006) and Lee (2013 Lee ( , 2014 .
In this paper we ask the following question -Is entry deterrence an optimal strategy for the incumbent? If there is no fixed cost of entry, then entry deterrence requires that the incumbent firm intermediate the entire market. However, there is an alternative strategy for the incumbent that may be more profitable. By strategically accommodating the entrant, the incumbent can earn a higher profit. This occurs when the variation in agents', i.e., match seekers', types is greater than a critical level. Now consider the case where the entrant has a fixed cost of entry. Intuitively, if the incumbent finds it profitable to deter entry when there is free entry, then it should be able to deter entry more easily when there is fixed cost of entry. We show that there is a wide range of parameter configurations such that strategic entry accommodation remains optimal for the incumbent even when there is fixed cost of entry.
It is well documented in the literature that, in one-sided markets, entry of new firms results in lower output of the incumbent firm as well as lower price. As a result, entry deterrence is generally preferred by the incumbent firm than entry accommodation and, thus, the incumbent firm often adopts anti-competitive strategies in order to deter entry.
In their early studies, Spence (1977 Spence ( , 1979 , Dixit (1979 Dixit ( , 1980 , Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) examine the efficacy of excess capacity, over production and over investment as entry deterring strategies and discuss the taxonomy of blockaded entry, deterred entry, and accommodated entry. Milgrom and Roberts (1981) argue that the incumbent firm can engage in limit pricing in order to deter entry under asymmetric information regarding the incumbent's marginal cost of production. The incumbent firm may also sign contracts with the buyers and/or input suppliers in order to deter entry (Aghion and Bolton, 1987; Dewatripont, 1987 Dewatripont, & 1988 Saha, 2006 & 2008) . In contrast, we show that in a two-sided market the incumbent can strategically engage in a contract with a subset of heterogeneous buyers, which enables the incumbent to charge higher price, and obtain higher profit by inducing entry of new firm in the market compared to that under entry deterrence.
Closest to the set-up of our model is Ramani (2015) . In Ramani (2015) the main objective is to justify a stylized fact of the online dating market -that there is market segmentation present. That is, in equilibrium, there are multiple intermediaries present, each of whom caters to different segments of the market. This finding is also confirmed in a study by Ahuvia and Adelman (1992) who state that "As the market for introduction services has become more crowded, these services have increasingly targeted narrower market niches such as ethnic groups, people with specific interests, the very rich, or marginalized groups such as the disabled". The discussion in Ramani (2015 The incumbent moves first and offers a contract to a subset of men and women. The entrant observes the actions of the incumbent and then chooses to "enter" or "stay out".
If there is entry, the entrant then offers a contract to a subset of men and women. After contracts have been offered by the firms, the agents decide whether to accept or reject their contract. Finally, intermediaries match the agents.
The basic structure of our game is similar to Ramani (2015) , where it is shown that there Before proceeding with the analysis, we first state the optimization problem of the incumbent and the entrant. The incumbent moves first and optimally chooses a cut-off type c 2 , and the entrant chooses the cut-off type c 1 . Given a c 2 > a being chosen by the incumbent, the entrant's problem is as follows.
M ax
(1)
Basically, the entrant has to ensure that the lowest type in the interval [c 1 , c 2 ) participates.
Let us denote the solution of problem (1) by c 1 = c 1 (c 2 ). As the match value exhibits complementarity, if the lowest type participates, all types x > c 1 also participate. The incumbent's problem is as follows.
subject to the constraints Proof: Please see the Appendix.
From Proposition 1 we know that by serving the entire market, i.e., by choosing c 2 = a, the incumbent can deter entry and earn profit
On the other hand, the incumbent can induce entry by not serving the entire market, i.e., by choosing c 2 > a. The question is, is it always optimal for the incumbent to deter entry?
In other words, does entry deterrence necessarily result in higher profit of the incumbent than that from entry accommodation?
Note that, in the case of entry accommodation, the problem of the entrant in the post entry scenario can be written as in (3). Solving the above problem, we get
Therefore, we can rewrite the incumbent's problem as follows.
subject to the constraints a < c 2 < b and (2).
Solving problem (7) we get the following (please see the Appendix for details).
c 2 =a + and c 1 = a, if a < b ≤ 2.4142a; where is a small positive number.
Clearly, the equilibrium choices of c 1 and c 2 are crucially dependent on relative magnitudes of a and b, i.e., on the extent of variation in agents' types. Substituting values of the equilibrium c 1 and c 2 , we get the incumbent's profit under entry accommodation as follows.
From (5) and (8) It is evident that, if a = 0, then for any b > 0 entry accommodation is the optimal strategy for the incumbent. However, if a > 0, then whether the incumbent will accommodate entry or deter entry that depends on the relative magnitude of b. If b is sufficiently greater than a, then the incumbent is better off by accommodating the entrant, while it is better off deterring entry otherwise. For the example, where the type distribution is uniform on [1, 2] ,
, since > 0. However, where the type distribution is uniform on [1, 10] ,
. That is, in equilibrium, whether the incumbent will deter entry or accommodate the entrant that depends not only on the degree of complementarity between the types but also on the set of types [a, b] in the market.
While we have considered the case of a uniform distribution in this paper, the proof is similar for a distribution for which the density function is increasing or a distribution for which the density function is decreasing, though the critical b is different in each case. If the density of types is increasing on [a, b] then the market has a greater concentration of high types and the incumbent will accommodate the entrant for a critical b smaller than 2.4142a. This is because, with greater concentration of high types, deterring entry is more costly as it reduces the fee that the incumbent can charge, whereas by accommodating the entrant the incumbent can charge a larger fee to the higher concentration of high types in the market. If the density function is decreasing on [a, b] then the critical value of b above which entry is accommodated is greater than that for a uniform distribution, because there is a greater concentration of lower types.
Proposition 2 presents an important result of this paper; viz. the incumbent can earn a higher profit by strategically accommodating the entrant, unless the coefficient of variation of types of agents in the market is less than a critical level. Interestingly, while entry deterrence causes the incumbent to be a monopolist, it still cannot charge the monopoly fee that it could charge in absence of entry threat. In a sense this is similar to the argument in the contestable markets literature wherein a firm in spite of being single in the market cannot charge the monopoly price. It is argued that the mere 
. That is, if the fixed cost of entry is sufficiently large (K ≥K), entry is blockaded. In other words, the possibility of entry arises only when K <K.
Since it is always feasible for the incumbent to deter entry in the case of no entry fee (K = 0), it is evident that the incumbent can do so more comfortably when there fixed entry cost (K > 0). That is, unlike as in the case of K = 0, the incumbent need not necessarily serve the entire market in order to deter entry. M ax
subject to the constraints
Clearly, the solution of the above problem is the same as that in (3). It implies that, in the event of entry, the entrant's choice of c 1 can be written as follows.
Corresponding profit of the entrant isπ E =
. Therefore, in order to deter entry the incumbent needs to choose c 2 such thatπ E ≤ 0. It is straight forward to observe that
Clearly, any c 2 ∈ [a,c 2 ] deters entry. But, in absence of entry threat, the incumbent's optimal choice of the marginal consumer is as follows.
Therefore, if the incumbent wants to deter entry, it will serve agents of type c det * 2 and higher, where
Upon inspection, we obtain the following. 
(f ) If 0 < 3a < b and
and π
.
Proof: Please see the Appendix.
From Corollary 1 it is evident that, when 0 < K <K, the incumbent would strategically choose c det * 2 > a in order to deter entry, unless the variation in agents' type is too small
. 7 In the latter case, i.e. if b < √ 3a, entry can be deterred by choosing c 2 > a, but the incumbent can obtain higher profit by setting c 2 = a. Further, note that, when
maximizes monopoly profit of the incumbent in absence of entry threat and c
. As a result, if 0 < √ 3a < b, entry deterring profit of the incumbent in the presence of fixed cost of entry is higher than that in Case 1. Otherwise, if b < √ 3a,
by deterring entry the incumbent obtains the same level of profit as that in Case 1.
On the other hand, it is easy to observe that, if the incumbent wants to accommodate entry, it needs to leave out a larger segment of the market for the entrant when there is a fixed cost of entry compared to that in absence of the fixed cost. This is because, in order to accommodate entry the incumbent needs to choose c 2 ∈ (c 2 , b) and
> 0. In other words, entry accommodation calls for decrease in the incumbent's market share in the present scenario compared to that in Case 1, which has a negative effect on incumbent's profit. However, since the incumbent now serves relatively higher type agents only, it can charge higher fees than in Case 1, which has a positive effect on its profits. The net effect of entry accommodation on incumbent's profit depends on relative magnitudes of a and b,
i.e., on the extent of variation in agents' types, as well as the amount of fixed cost of entry.
Formally, we can write the incumbent's problem, if it wants to accommodate entry when there is fixed cost of entry, as follows. Proposition 4 states that the incumbent prefers to accommodate entry over entry deterrence for a large number of parametric configurations, even when there is a fixed cost of entry.
The greater the variation in agents' types and/or lower the entrant's fixed cost, the greater is the possibility of entry accommodation in the equilibrium.
Conclusion
This paper presents a framework for analyzing competition between intermediaries by considering a model of intermediation where two matchmakers, an incumbent and an entrant compete for market share by offering contracts to match types of agents on the two sides of the market. Contrary to the prediction of existing models of entry, this paper demonstrates that entry accommodation, not entry deterrence, is often the optimal strategy of the incumbent. It implies that coexistence of multiple intermediaries in a market need not necessarily be due to incumbent's inability to effectively deter entry, unlike as commonly perceived. This result highlights the importance of considering specific characteristics of the market while formulating business strategies and entry regulations.
In this paper we have assumed a particular belief system of agents', i.e., of buyers', which leads to market segmentation in the case of entry accommodation. It might be interesting to extend the analysis to allow for endogenous market segmentation without relying on agents' prior beliefs. It also seems to be interesting to examine the social welfare implications of entry accommodation and entry deterrence in the case of two-sided markets. We leave these for future research. Solving this problem, we get c 2 =
. Now, > 0. It also follows that, when b ≤ 2.4142a, entry will not be accommodated.
Proof of Proposition 3: Proposition 3(a) is immediate form the previous discussion.
The proof of Proposition 3(b) is as follows.
For any given c 2 , the entrant's profit can be expressed as
This follows from the fact that there exists a weak sequential equilibrium when entry occurs. Now, π E (c 2 ) is continuous in c 2 . Therefore, by the Intermediate Value Theorem,
and, thus, entry will take place.
Proof of Corollary 1: First, let us consider that 0 < a < b < √ 3a and 0 ≤ K. In this case, we have the following.c 2 = a, by (11) .c 1 = a, by (6a). Therefore,c 2 = c 2 ,
by (10) . Further note that c 2 ≥ a, since K ≥ 0 and 0 < a < b. Therefore, c Next, let us consider that 0 < √ 3a < b. In this case, we have the following.
(ii) If
. Otherwise, if
, by (10) , (11) and (12) . However, when 0 < √ 3a < b,c 1 = a holds true provided that
] or [0 < 3a < b and
together implies that
]. Thus, we have the following.
,c 1 = a and c . Therefore
• If 0 < 3a < b and 0 < K ≤ It is also easy to check that when 0 (10) , (11) and (12) . But, when 0 < √ 3a < b,c 1 =
holds true provided that 0 < √ 3a < c 2 < b is satisfied. Now, 0 < √ 3a < c 2 < b and
together implies that [0 < 3a < b and • If 0 < 3a < b and
We have shown that, if b < 2.414a, it is optimal for the incumbent to choose c 2 = a. Thus, if 0 < a < b < √ 3a, entry will not be accommodated in the equilibrium.
In this case c 2 = c 2 deters entry.
It is now evident that, if 0 < √ 3a < b < 2.414a, c 0 2 < a and, thus, entry will not be accommodated. Clearly, if the variation in agents's types is small (b < 2.414a), entry deterrence is optimal, regardless of the magnitude of the entrant's fixed cost. and, thus, the incumbent's profit from setting c 2 > c 2 to induce entry will be even lower than π acc I . That is, if K > K 1 , entry will not be accommodated.
Therefore, in this case, entry accommodation is preferred to entry deterrence when 2.414a < b < 3a and 0 < K < K 2 . . However, we also have, π det I > π acc I . Therefore, choosing c 2 greater than c 0 2 will lead to less profit for the incumbent than that in the case of entry deterrence. Thus, it is optimal for the incumbent to deter entry.
Sub-case (c)
From sub-cases (a), (b) and (c), we can say that if the variation in agents' types is moderate (2.414a < b < 3.474a), then entry accommodation is optimal provided that the fixed cost of entry is less than a critical level (0 < K < K 2 < K 1 ). From the results obtained in sub-case (a) -(f), Proposition 4 is immediate.
Sub

